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The new Bill on land acquisition recently tabled in Parliament is well intentioned but seriously 
flawed. Its principal defect is that it attaches an arbitrary mark-up to the historical market price to 
determine compensation amounts.  This will guarantee neither social justice nor the efficient use 
of resources. The Bill also places unnecessary and severe conditions on land acquisition, such as 
restrictions on the use of multi-cropped land and insistence on public purpose, all of which are 
going to stifle the pace of development without promoting the interests of farmers. We present an 
alternative  approach  that  will  allow  farmers  to  choose  compensation  in  either  land  or  cash, 
determine their own price instead of leaving it to the government’s discretion, and also reallocate 
the remaining farmland  in  the most efficient  manner. Our proposed method involves  a land 
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Introduction 
 
Land acquisition has become the most vexing problem for policy makers in India. Names like 
Singur,  Nandigram,  Kalinganagar,  Jaitapur  and  Bhatta  Parsaul  have  entered  our  lexicon  as 
poignant  metaphors  of  social  conflict.  The  Left  Front,  which  built  a  remarkable  political 
hegemony in West Bengal largely on the basis of Operation Barga and land reforms, has been 
brought  to  its  knees after  a botched attempt  at wresting  a thousand acres  for a car  factory, 
illustrating  how  land  issues  have  a  seismic  potential  in  our  political  landscape.  The  post-
liberalisation economic boom  continues  to create a voracious  appetite for space  to  meet  the 
demands of industrialisation, infrastructure building, urban expansion and resource extraction. 
Finding a way to balance the needs of economic growth, equitable distribution and human rights, 
rescuing these complex and sometimes conflicting objectives from the demagoguery of single 
issue advocates (Bardhan (2011)) and political opportunists, is perhaps the greatest challenge 
facing our democracy. 
           The importance of the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation & Resettlement Bill (LARR, 
2011) recently tabled in Parliament cannot, therefore, be overstated.  The Bill closely follows the 
recommendations of the Working Group of the National Advisory Council (NAC, 2011), though 
it differs on some key points. The salient features of the proposed legislation are as follows. It 
significantly  increases  the  minimum  compensation  payable,  but  continues  to  use  the  market 
price, obtained from recently registered sale deeds from the region, as a yardstick. The minimum 
compensation has been fixed at four times the market price in rural areas and twice the market 
price in urban areas. LARR, 2011, which is a comprehensive Bill on land acquisition as well as 
rehabilitation & resettlement  (R&R), subjects all eminent domain acquisitions as well private 
purchases of over 100 acres in rural areas and 50 acres in urban areas to a mandatory R&R 
package, with a host of benefits both for affected landowners as well as livelihood losers. These 
benefits include annuities, transportation allowance, land for land, a portion of capital gains from 
resale, and the construction of alternative housing and communal amenities in the event of loss 
of homestead. In addition to defining compensation parameters, the proposed law also places 
stringent restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain, placing restrictions on the use of multi-
cropped land and tightening the definition of ‘public purpose’. Procedural safeguards have also 
been introduced, including social impact assessment, adequate notification and consent of at least 
80% of the affected community. 
Unfortunately, the draft’s good intentions are not matched by sound economic reasoning.  
The principal drawback, in our view, is the choice of an arbitrary mark-up over market price for   3 
compensation  purposes.  Given  how  land  markets  operate  in  India,  market  price  is  not  an 
adequate anchor for compensation, and this ad hoc formula will guarantee neither social justice 
nor efficient use of a scarce resource, notwithstanding its pro-poor appearance.  We outline, 
instead, a procedure based on a land auction, covering both the project area and surrounding 
farmland. If properly implemented, this procedure will allow farmers to choose compensation in 
either  land  or  cash,  determine  their  own  price  instead  of  leaving  it  to  the  government’s 
discretion, and reallocate the remaining farmland in the most efficient manner. It will not only 
protect the interests of landowners and reduce political resistance to industrialisation, it should 
also render some of the stringent restrictions in the Bill (e.g., conditions on the use of multi-
cropped land and stringent criteria to meet the standards of ‘public purpose’) unnecessary. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We first provide an analysis of the nature 
of the economic problem involved in assuming agricultural land for industrial and urban use. We 
next  outline  our  proposed  solution  and  explain  its  main  advantages.  This  is  followed  by  a 
detailed  critique  of  some  of  the  problematic  features  of  LARR,  2011,  apart  from  its  main 
shortcoming,  namely,  arbitrary  pricing.  We  also  briefly  address  the  issue  of  compensating 
stakeholders other than those with formal property rights – groups such as sharecroppers, farm 
labourers and artisans. 
 
Diagnosing the Problem 
 
The overwhelming question that lies at the centre of the land acquisition issue is the following: 
how should  be landowners  compensated when the state seizes  private land for development 
projects? This should be viewed as a general question - we should search for a mechanism or 
formula that will yield satisfactory results when applied to any particular case, rather than try to 
find answers on a case by case basis. One too often hears glib criticism that the government’s 
compensation package in Singur or Noida or Kalinganagar was ‘not enough’, without a clear 
statement of a general principle as to how much is ‘enough’. Surely the answer would depend on 
local conditions like soil fertility, access to irrigation, cost of living, alternative employment 
opportunities and so on, and there cannot be a magic number that will work for every region of 
the country. The useful question to ask is not what the displaced farmers should have received 
here or there but how this amount should be determined.   
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 lays down such a principle – compensation should be 
equal to the local market price for land. More specifically, the law says that it should be the 
average price of all land transactions completed in the area in the previous three years. This is   4 
viewed  by  many  as  inadequate  compensation,  but  a  compelling  reason  is  rarely  articulated. 
Attempts to remedy the perceived shortfall usually involve slapping an ad hoc mark-up on the 
market price, and this is the approach adopted in the NAC’s recommendations and incorporated 
in  LARR, 2011. Our view is  that the use of  historical  market  price  even  for benchmarking 
purposes should be abandoned altogether. 
Some problems with the market price are easy to see. In many regions, transactions are 
few and not well documented, leaving considerable room for officials to manipulate the figure by 
use of selective sampling or fake transactions. Distress sales constitute a bulk of the transactions, 
and  the  full  value  is  often  concealed  to  escape  stamp  duty.  Furthermore,  any  industrial  or 
development  project  will  cause  significant  appreciation  of  real  estate  prices,  making  it 
impossible for displaced farmers to buy back land with compensation money if they so wished.  
These  are,  however,  secondary  concerns.  The  use  of  market  price  for  voluntary 
transactions as a proxy for owners’ value in forced acquisitions is so fundamentally flawed that it 
is a surprise it has been taken seriously at all. The value of a piece of land to its owner is not 
some  tangible  attribute  that  can  be  objectively  measured  by  experts  but  rather  a  subjective 
quantity – it is whatever the owner deems it to be. Moreover, there is going to be substantial 
heterogeneity among owners in the valuation of land. Heterogeneity would arise even if we were 
to think of land value being derived from the flow of crop output alone, because farmers differ in 
their endowments of skill, knowledge, capital, farming assets like bullocks or tractors, market 
access, access to alternative methods of earning a livelihood etc. There are, in addition, many 
other potential sources of value for land – collateral for loans, assured source of employment for 
family labour, insurance against food price fluctuations via self-consumption and even social 
prestige associated with land ownership. Different owners are likely to impute these values very 
differently.  For  example,  small  farmers  will  have  more  pressing  credit  and  collateral  needs 
compared to large and affluent landowners, absentee landlords will have lower valuation than 
resident owners since they do not derive self-employment or self-consumption benefits from the 
land, and so on. 
A market transaction arises when the owner of an asset meets another person who values 
the  asset  more  than  the  owner,  and  together  they  negotiate  a  price  which  is  somewhere  in 
between their respective valuations. In a perfect asset market, all current owners should value the 
asset more than the prevailing market price because otherwise, it would be better for them to sell 
rather than hold on to their land. If their assets are now forcibly seized, it is clear that the market   5 
price, far from being a good estimate of their valuation, will actually be a lower bound on it.
1 A 
lot has been written about the corruption and venality of the process , the subversion of property 
rights by a nexus of greedy capitalists and their political cronies, or the coercive tendencies of a 
neo-liberal  economic regime. The fact of the matter is that the current legal formula for 
compensation is seriously flawed and woul d be reason enough for disaffection even if it were 
assiduously implemented by honest bureaucrats and politicians. 
This critique is, however, vulnerable to one objection. If the government confiscated your 
car, but paid its market price,  it wouldn’t matter how badly you needed the vehicle – you can 
immediately go out and buy another one just like it.  If the land market works well enough, the 
displaced farmer’s subjective valuation of land should be irrelevant because a compensation set 
equal to market price will allow him to re-purchase land in the neighbourhood (assuming that 
expected future prices rather than historical prices are used for compensation purposes). One 
common  criticism  of  cash  compensation  is  that  it  replaces  a  familiar  asset  (land)  with  an 
unfamiliar  one  (paper  assets),  destroying  the  value  of  the  farmer’s  asset  specific  skills  and 
leaving him vulnerable to bad investments or self-control problems associated with liquid wealth 
(see Banerji and Ghatak (2010)). This criticism implicitly assumes that various forms of wealth 
are not easily convertible. Is the assumption justified given the empirical reality of rural India? 
There is good reason to think it is. Market price may be a good compensation benchmark for 
people who lose homes to make way for infrastructure projects in big cities (e.g., the metro rail) 
because  the  urban  real  estate  market  is  relatively  well  developed.  The  asset  market  for 
agriculture land in India is extremely thin, fragmented and riddled with frictions of all sorts.
2 
Once someone loses  some  arable land, it may be very difficult to buy   it again  even if the 
dispossessed is endowed with a bundle of cash. 
If our diagnosis is correct, any workable solution to the land acquisitio n problem must 
have  two  essential   features.  First,  it  must  come  up  with  a  formula  for  deter mining  a 
compensation amount that reflects the dispossessed owners’ own valuation of their assets. This 
method should be transparent and non-manipulable, and should leave no room for discretion in 
the hands of the state, its officials or appointed experts. Furthermore, the method must be such 
that landowners are incentivised to reveal the true value of their plots in their own estimate. The 
                                                 
1 In formal economic terms, one cannot use the market price to impute value for infra-marginal agents. 
 
2 For example,  Deininger et al (2007) look at NCAER data on land transactions over the period 1982-1999 based on 
household data (as opposed to land censuses) and find that 15% and 8% (or 0.88% and 0.47% annually) of the 
population were involved in purchasing or selling land, respectively. Correspondingly, 9% and 5% of the land that 
the sample households owned were bought and sold.      6 
problem with the market price is that it underestimates the owners’ valuation, and the problem 
with negotiated prices is that owners have every reason to make exaggerated claims. Second, the 
acquisition process must also make up for the absence of well-functioning land markets in the 
area. Whenever a large chunk of arable land is diverted to other use, economic efficiency dictates 
that the ownership pattern on the remaining land must be reshuffled so that those who place the 
greatest value on land end up remaining owners even if their previously held plots are seized for 
non-agricultural use. For example, if a land-hungry peasant’s plot is eaten up by an industrial 
plant  while  an  absentee  landlord’s  farm  remains  untouched  by  virtue  of  falling  outside  the 
project site, there will probably exist room for a further transaction that should make all parties 
better off – resettle the displaced peasant on the absentee landlord’s land and pay compensation 
to the latter instead of the former. The role of a land market is to achieve precisely this sort of 
reallocation, and in its absence, the land acquisition process should aim to fulfil this role. That 
will go a long way towards promoting efficient land use, minimizing the compensation bill, 
keeping agricultural productivity high and ensuring social justice. 
 
A Proposed Compensation Policy 
 
We  will  now  outline  our  main  proposal  regarding  a  compensation  policy  for  displaced 
landowners. The highlights of our proposed solution are: (a) the transfer price is determined by a 
land auction and not left to the state’s discretion (b) displaced farmers get an option to choose 
compensation in cash or compensation in land (c) the area of intervention is extended beyond the 
project area to surrounding farmland. 
Let  us  take  the  case  of  Singur  for  illustration.  The  proposed  factory  was  to  occupy 
approximately 1,000 acres. Demarcate an area which is twice the size (say) of the project site, 
i.e., 2,000 acres. This should include the project site itself (to be referred to as the core) and a 
belt of additional farmland surrounding it, amounting to another 1,000 acres (to be referred to as 
the periphery).
3 All owners within this operational zone of 2,000 acres will be asked to submit 
tender bids for selling their land to the government. The 1,000 acres on which bids are the lowest 
                                                 
3 How large the periphery should be relative to the core is a matter of judgement, and we do not have a magic 
number to propose. Enlarging the coverage area of the auction involves trade-offs. The primary trade-off is an 
increase in the average distance of relocation for those who swap land for land, against increased competition and 
allocative efficiency. A helpful factor is that average distance of relocation should increase in proportion to the 
square root of the coverage area. For example, if the project site is visualized as a circle and the auction covers an 
area up to twice its radius, then the area under the auction will be four times the area of the project site. It is needless 
to say that farmers who swap land for land should be paid relocation costs commensurate with the distance of 
displacement and associated inconveniences.   7 
will be procured against cash compensation, and all of them will be paid a uniform price equal to 
the bid on the marginal acre that is not acquired in the auction (i.e., the bid on the 1,001
th acre of 
land when they are arranged in ascending order of asking price). To discourage collusion among 
bidders and to reflect the value of land in its intended alternative use, the government may set a 
reserve price. The acquisition process will be scrapped and other sites sought if the price in the 
auction exceeds the reserve price. 
Obviously this process will not solve the problem entirely, since the procured land will 
have an arbitrary spatial distribution which will usually not coincide exactly with the intended 
site of the project. Some of it will fall in the core and some of it will fall in the periphery. Note, 
however, that the area of land within the core that remains unsold in the auction must be exactly 
equal to the area of land procured in the periphery. The last step of the process is to take land 
from farmers in the core who haven’t sold for cash and compensate them with the plots of equal 
size procured in the periphery. 
In cases where the state procures land on behalf of industries, it is of utmost importance 
that there be no subsidies, i.e., the entire burden of compensation and R&R be borne by the 
industrialist. The state’s only role should be to administer the auction and preserve its integrity, 
in addition to applying the minimal coercion involved in forcing the hands of those who are 
unwilling to do even land swaps. As noted by many commentators, a major problem faced in the 
last several years has been that various state governments have engaged in fierce competition to 
attract investment to their states, with the attendant promise of industrialisation and employment 
generation,  if  not  opportunities  for  kickbacks  to  politicians  and  public  officials.  This  has 
generated a race to the bottom where most of the surplus generated from land conversion has 
gone into the pockets of capitalists instead of landowners, the local population or taxpayers. 
West Bengal’s disastrous experience in Singur probably owes much to the fact that the CPI(M) 
government, in its desperation to reverse the deindustrialisation of the state, offered land to the 
Tatas at throwaway prices (Sarkar (2007)), leading it to skimp on its compensation offers since 
the state exchequer had to pick up the tab. There is an obvious need for a Central law that 
prohibits subsidies and curbs the economically ruinous competition among states for investment 
and capital. Since land is on the concurrent list, this involves legal and jurisdictional issues that 
need to be sorted out. 
 
Our auction based approach has several advantages, which we now discuss in detail: 
   8 
(1) The single most significant feature of our proposal is that it is considerably less coercive. The 
existing law of eminent domain leaves the landowner powerless in every dimension. Not 
only does the state compel him to surrender his land, it reserves the right to name its own 
price. Legally stipulated compensation formulae, such as market price or a mark-up over 
market price plus stipends (as specified in the LARR, 2011), ties the hand of the state to 
some extent but uses no input at all from the affected parties. In contrast, our proposal offers 
the farmer choice in the form of compensation – it can be taken either in cash or land. 
Moreover,  the  amount  of  cash  compensation  is  derived  entirely  from  the  asking  prices 
submitted by the landowners themselves, and is designed to exceed, not fall short of, the bid 
on every plot of land that is acquired against cash. This approach should shut down two of 
the most common complaints heard about land acquisition in India – that displaced farmers 
have not received enough compensation, and those who are highly dependent on land have 
been deprived of an asset that is central to their lives. The process still contains a small 
degree  of  coercion,  because  farmers  who  insist  on  not  merely  holding  land  but  holding 
particular  plots  (perhaps  due  to  the  sentimental  value  of  ancestral  property)  have  to  be 
forcibly moved if their preferred plots fall in the core area. However, there can be little doubt 
that our proposed method reduces the degree of coercion to its bare minimum, compared to 
the approaches that we have seen so far, including that of LARR, 2011. The only way to 
make it even less coercive is to eliminate any role for the state and rely entirely on open 
market purchases, an option feasible only for private projects. We will comment later on why 
we  think  exclusive  dependence  on  private  transactions  will  be  unwise  for  big  industrial 
projects involving many interested parties. 
 
(2) Our proposal gives the farmer a strong incentive to bid truthfully, i.e., ask for a compensation 
amount for which he is truly willing to part with his plot, instead of strategically inflating his 
asking price. The reason behind this is not very hard to see. The auction is set up in a way 
such that a uniform price is applied to all plots for which compensation is to be paid in cash, 
and this price is equal to the lowest losing bid. This means that by varying his bid, an owner 
cannot affect the compensation he will receive, only the probability that he will be paid in 
cash instead of land. Since it is better for him to receive cash compensation if and only if it 
exceeds his true valuation for land, it is best for him to bid his true value.
4 Farmers must be 
                                                 
4 Technically speaking, the auction proposed here is a uniform price, sealed bid auction or a multi-unit Vickrey 
auction, with the added feature of land swaps between non-sellers in the core and sellers in the periphery once the 
auction is over. We implicitly assume a private values environment. Bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy in   9 
given time and advice to understand the logic of the auction they are participating in, and it is 
possible that they will miss some of its strategic nuance even after prolonged reflection. 
However, the fact that one should not significantly overbid or underbid is not difficult to 
appreciate from a common sense perspective. Someone who has a low value for land (say, an 
absentee landlord) will be relatively eager to receive cash compensation, but will run the risk 
of being stuck with another piece of a low yield asset if he bids too high. Someone who 
values land  greatly has  no reason  to  ask  for  compensation  that is  insufficient,  given his 
personal valuation of his asset.  
 
(3) One of the most common complaints heard about the current acquisition process is that it 
prevents owners of acquired plots from reaping the benefits of appreciated real estate prices 
that come in the wake of industrial and commercial development of the area.
5 Anyone who is 
compelled to sell now will lose out in comparison to his neighbour whose lan d lies outside 
the project zone by happy accident, since the latter can wait and sell  his property when the 
real estate boom fully arrives. This is economically crushing for farmers who would like to 
buy back land and continue cultivation, and is aggravating even for those who are happy with 
cash and not particularly committed to farming. Our proposal removes this arbitrary source 
of inequality by treating all local landowners (those owning plots in the project zone as well 
as outside) at par, allowing farmers to incorporate their own estimates of  future land price 
inflation into their bids.
6 It also eliminates the problem of hold -up often associated with 
private acquisitions  – an owner who holds out till the end, while neighbouring plots are 
                                                                                                                                            
such auctions if buyers/sellers have inelastic demand/supply, a property that also guarantees allocative efficiency – 
scarce resources end up in the hands of those who value it most. The single unit Vickrey auction with a reserve price 
is also a cost minimizing way of procuring assets, though the generalization of this feature to multiple units and 
asymmetric bidders requires additional assumptions. See Milgrom (2004) for a theoretical discussion of these issues. 
 
5 For example, according to newspaper reports, the value of the land that was acquired for the Yamuna Expressway 
connecting Noida and Agra in Uttar Pradesh has already gone up 50 times in less than a decade. Nine years ago 
when the state government acquired this land, it paid farmers Rs 50-300 a sq m. Today, in the same location, the 
Jaypee group building the Yamuna Expressway and a 2,500-acre Sports City (with a cricket stadium and Formula-1 
race track) is selling plots at Rs 15,000 a sq m. (see http://jllindia.wordpress.com/2010/09/13/land-prices-up-50-
times-in-10-years/). It is not at all obvious that the proposed Bill’s four-fold mark-up would be enough to satisfy 
sellers in a situation like this. 
 
6 A concern we have often heard is that farmers may be too ill informed to have a good idea about the potential for 
land price inflation. Consequently, they may bid too low and regret it later. While this may prevent them from 
capturing a part of the surplus, the auction should at least ensure that they recover their own livelihood losses and 
are no worse off than before the project arrived. If land is surrendered at a price of the owner’s choosing rather than 
one dictated to him, there is less room for political trouble later, even if farmers realize they made mistakes. A 
related observation is that people with political connections and access to inside information may surreptitiously buy 
up land around the project site before it is announced, and deprive the owners of windfalls. This is an independent 
problem and requires independent measures to be tackled. Inefficient land transfer policies will not stop insider 
trading in the real estate market.   10 
bought up, gives himself a very strong bargaining position. Many of these problems arise 
from the sequential and staggered nature of the acquisition process, which we collapse into a 
single round of bidding and sorting. 
 
(4) Finally, our proposal has a provision for the acquisition effort to fail and for land to remain in 
agricultural use. This will happen when the price in the auction ends up above the reservation 
price set by the government. It is generally assumed that the value created by industrial use 
of  an  acre  of  land  is  orders  of  magnitude  higher  than  what  can  be  generated  by  crop 
cultivation. This is probably true in most cases, but we see no reason why the acquisition 
process should take this for granted instead of putting it to the test. Industrialisation is not an 
article  of  faith;  it  should  proceed  only  where  it  demonstrably  increases  the  size  of  the 
economic pie. The onus should lie on industry to demonstrate this by competitively bidding 
for the scarce economic resources it wants to divert from agriculture. 
 
There are myriad details to be worked out and logistical challenges met before a plan like 
this  can  be  operationalized.  We  have  focused  on  heterogeneity  among  farmers  in  terms  of 
dependence on land and ignored heterogeneity in land quality, implicitly assuming that all plots 
of the same size are perfect substitutes. In reality, there will be differences arising from soil 
quality, gradient, access to water sources, sunk investments like pump sets, etc. Farmers must 
receive  supplementary  payments  to  account  for  these  factors,  as  well  as  relocation  costs, 
distance-from-home issues, plot fragmentation, etc. These additional awards can be covered by 
ad  hoc  payments  similar  to  those  in  LARR,  2011,  or  customized  based  on  assessment  of 
individual circumstances, as determined by the Collector.
7 In some cases, the proposed project 
may have an environmental impact that reduces yields and lowers the value of  surrounding 
farmland (e.g., through groundwater depletion or pollution). The auction price will not recover 
these damages, since competitive bidders will shade their bids to reflect the reduced potential of 
their land. Independent environmental assessments and award of ad hoc compensations on that 
account may be necessary where relevant.  The auction rules  will  also  have to be clearly 
explained to farmers and its implications fully absorbed before proceeding with implementation.  
                                                 
7 If there is land of variable quality under the auction, some method has to be devised to come up with a 
conversion scale. This could be constructed by comparing past productivity. For example, if plot A has produced 
twice as much crop value as plot B, it may be deemed twice the size of plot B even if they have the same physical 
dimensions. This is unsatisfactory for a lot of reasons, especially because productivity differences may arise not 
from differences in plot quality but differences in the skill and resources of farmers who cultivated them. Note, 
however, that the proposed Bill suffers from the same problem, since it specifies uniform compensation rates.   11 
Our goal here is not to present a complete blueprint of a solution but a broad outline. 
Auctions have proved very effective in several countries in recent times, albeit for much more 
high-tech allocations like spectrum licenses. They are also widely employed in procurement of 
food grains by the FCI as well as in private wholesale trade. Had the task been one of acquiring a 
thousand acres from the vast sea of agricultural land stretching across the country, it would have 
been cheapest, most efficient and least contentious to do it through an auction. The problem at 
hand  is  more  restrictive  –  the  acquisition  must  be  a  specific  thousand  acres  of  contiguous 
territory. We have argued that with only slight modification, essentially the same principles can 
be applied to this more constrained problem. Our proposed method is designed to kill two birds 
with  one  stone.  First,  it  determines  a  fair  price  not  through  government  fiat  but  through  a 
participatory process of competitive bidding where farmers are free to name their own price and 
choose their form of compensation (cash or land). Second, it fills in for missing or imperfect land 
markets in the region by reallocating the remaining farmland to those who place the highest 
economic value on such an asset. 
 
The Proposed Bill: Additional Critique 
 
Our main criticism of LARR, 2011, is that it relies on arbitrary pricing, which will neither ensure 
that farmers are adequately compensated for their lost assets, nor guarantee that a scarce resource 
like land will be put to its most productive use. The Bill has other questionable features to which 
we now turn our attention. These provisions have little merit when combined with the ad hoc 
compensation  rates,  and  will  be  detrimental  when  the  compensation  is  determined  through 
competitive bidding, as we suggest.  
 
(A) Public purpose:  The public purpose clause features in most eminent domain legislation not 
just in India but internationally. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, stipulates a public purpose 
behind  acquisition  (part  II,  section  6)  but  also  provides  for  acquisition  on  behalf  of 
companies for the purpose of residential construction for its employees (part VII, section 40). 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S Constitution declares: “… nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.” Of course ‘public’ purpose is a vague term, 
and  governments  have  naturally  taken  interpretive  liberties  while  operationalising  the 
concept,  and  courts  have  generally  refused  to  second  guess  executive  judgement  in  this 
matter. The Supreme Court of India is on record, saying: “The concept of public purpose has 
to be held to be wider than ‘public necessity’”, and has permitted the use of eminent domain   12 
for such purposes as the construction of a paper mill or a factory manufacturing electric 
compressors (Desai (2011)).
8 In Kelo vs. City of New London, 2005, the U.S Supreme Court 
controversially  ruled  in  favour  of  the  city  of  New  London,  which  had  acquired  prime 
waterfront property and handed it over to commercial developers on the grounds that it will 
serve the public interest by creating jobs, generating tax revenue and rejuvenating an ailing 
local  economy.  Interestingly,  it  is  the  Court’s  conservative  faction,  usually  perceived  as 
friendly towards the interests of big business, which offered a dissenting opinion, while the 
liberal wing took an expansive view of the state’s right to confiscate private property.
9 
We think the entire focus on public purpose is misplaced, not merely because of the 
difficulties of enforcement, but due to a conceptual blurring of utilitarian and rights based 
perspectives. It is inconsistent to stick to both principles, and the attempt to combine strong 
protections for private property with a narrow public purpose requirement leads to either a 
contradiction or a redundancy. The insistence on a public purpose implicitly assumes that 
those who have to surrender property are being called upon to make sacrifices for the greater 
common  good,  i.e.,  the  interests  of  a  few  must  give  way  to  the  interests  of  many.  The 
insistence on just compensation upholds the notion that the economic interests, if not formal 
consent
10, of property owners cannot be compromised   for any reason, however socially 
desirable. If care is taken so that the economic interests of owners are indeed protected, how 
does it matter to what alternative use their seized assets are going to be employed? If a golf 
course or luxury housing project can afford to pay affected farmers enough to improve  their 
standard of living, it is hard to see why anyone should object. If a proposed defence facility 
                                                 
8 In two very recent judgements, however, a two-judge bench of the apex court seems to have gone against the grain 
of previous rulings. These are Sharan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Banda Development Authority vs. Motilal 
Agarwal. See Desai (2011) for further discussion. 
 
9 Ironically, it is the arch conservative Clarence Thomas’s dissenting opinion that echoes the concerns expressed by 
the egalitarian left in the Indian context: “Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is 
bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees 
that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically 
less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.
” In sharp 
contrast, the majority view offers the state great discretion in determining what constitutes public interest: “For more 
than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of 
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.” 
 
10 If a mechanism is devised that guarantees farmers either a similar piece of land or a cash compensation that is 
adequate in their own estimate, the issue of consent will be superfluous in most cases. There will, however, be 
instances where large non-economic costs are involved, e.g., if the seized property has substantial sentimental value 
to the owner, so that another piece of similar property does not serve as a close substitute. In Kelo vs. New London, 
petitioner Wilhelmina Dery did not complain on the basis of economic losses but the pain of losing a home where 
she had spent her entire life. We feel that it is only in such cases, where assets have non-replaceable qualities, that 
the state may be justified in imposing coercion in the social interest. Compensation can only be paid for things 
which can be replaced. 
   13 
claims to serve the national interest, yet the government cannot find enough tax revenue to 
adequately  compensate  displaced  landowners,  one  has  to  ask  whether  its  claimed  social 
benefits are real. If society is to violate property rights for whatever reason, it should put its 
money where its mouth is. 
We need to clarify what we see as the government’s role in the exercise of eminent 
domain. One view is that of a utilitarian social planner. Under such a view, the state can sit 
in judgement about the merits of alternative uses of land and take compensation obligations 
lightly.  An  alternative  view  is  that  the  state’s  role  is  to  facilitate  complex  economic 
transactions, reduce transaction costs and safeguard the interests of the weak. Under this 
view, the state’s efforts should be concentrated almost  exclusively on  securing adequate 
compensation for those who have to give up land. We favour the latter view. If properly 
implemented, it should promote both economic efficiency and social justice. It is worthwhile 
to  keep in  mind that some of the worst  human suffering in  independent  India has  been 
inflicted in the cause of public projects like large dams, Nehru’s temples of modern India.
11 
On the other hand, farmers have reportedly become rich in places like Gurgaon by selling 
their land to private property developers for housing projects. The time has come to see the 
farming community not as perennial victims of modernity but as potential stakeholders and 
beneficiaries of economic development by virtue of the valuable assets they own.
12 These 
assets should not be zealously locked away for traditional use but should serve as keys to the 
vault where much of India’s newly generated wealth is being stored. 
 
(B) Multi-cropped  land:  The  draft  Bill  previously  circulated  by  the  Ministry  of  Rural 
Development (MRD, 2011) simply declared all irrigated multi-cropped land off limits, which 
was in line with the sentiments expressed by Mamata Banerjee’s government as well as some 
commentators on the issue. The version tabled before Parliament (LARR, 2011) relaxes this 
constraint somewhat by allowing the acquisition of multi-cropped land under “exceptional 
circumstances” and up to a cumulative ceiling of 5% of such land in the district. It also 
waives the requirement for “linear projects” like railways, highways and power lines.  
The  restrictions  on  use  of  multi-cropped  land  are  still  a  significant  constraint  on 
industrialisation if not infrastructure building, since more than half the cultivated land in the 
                                                 
11 See Duflo and Pandey (2007) for a comprehensive study of the social impact of dam construction in India after 
Independence. 
 
12 Indeed, the proposed Bill embraces such a philosophy at the very outset when it declares: “…the cumulative 
outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become partners in development leading to an 
improvement in their post acquisition social and economic status…”   14 
country is multi-cropped. This is particularly true in regions surrounding the major metros, 
where demand for agricultural land is the highest. The thinking behind such a proscription is 
difficult  to  understand,  and  its  contradictions  are  similar  to  those  of  the  public  purpose 
clause. If the concern is that farmers may be given a raw deal, what matters is not whether 
the land grows one crop or three but whether the compensation paid is enough to cover the 
value of the crop that will be lost. Since farmers in single-cropped regions are generally 
poorer and more economically vulnerable, the first egalitarian instinct should have been to 
erect a protective legal fence around their property instead of rushing to quarantine relatively 
prosperous multi-cropped land. The restrictions clearly reflect a concern not for the affected 
farmers’ welfare but aggregate food production and prices, i.e., it is utilitarian in outlook. 
That industrialisation may lead to food shortages is an alarmist view. The fraction of 
agricultural land required for industrial production is too small to make more than a dent on 
overall food production. For this reason, the literature on economic development has paid 
almost exclusive attention to the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry along the path 
of development, and has neglected the issue of land altogether. Infrastructure projects and 
urban expansion are likely to shrink agricultural land to a greater extent, but even there, the 
demand is going to be quite small relative to total availability. It is worth noting that most 
industrialised nations are self-sufficient in food production in spite of a tiny fraction of the 
labour force being  engaged in  farming, and this  has  been made possible  by  a sustained 
increase in agricultural productivity partly brought about by the fruits of industrialisation 
such as fertilizers and irrigation technology.  At any rate, the price mechanism provides a 
check on economically injudicious use of agricultural land. As crop output starts falling, 
prices  will  start  to  rise,  leading  to  higher  compensation  demands  from  farmers,  forcing 
industry to internalize the opportunity cost of industrial expansion. Much of the thinking on 
this issue is based on a centralized planning mindset, even though the assets and outputs in 
question are not supplied in a planned economy but through the market mechanism, whose 
allocative functions cannot be ignored while formulating policy.  
Another point which is important in this context is that the economic value of an 
industrial plant can also be highly sensitive to its location, depending on factors such as 
access  to  water,  electricity,  road  and  railway  networks,  skilled  labour,  etc.  This  is  why 
industrialists  will typically have  a preference  for locating  factories  close to  major urban 
centres  and  connecting  highways.  One  reason  for  Singur’s  attractiveness  to  the  Tatas  is 
obvious – it sits just off the newly built Durgapur Expressway, providing easy access to 
Kolkata as well as other towns  in  West  Bengal’s industrial belt. As long  as  industry is   15 
obliged to pay compensation that fully captures the value of the lost agricultural output and 
livelihoods, there is no reason why its location preference should not be taken into account. 
Since  acquiring  fertile,  multi-cropped  land  will  be  more  costly  for  industry  than  single-
cropped or fallow land (assuming the compensation system has been set up right), there is no 
reason why it would want to do so unless  it anticipates enough  additional benefits. The 
insistence on protecting multi-cropped land is baffling and counter-productive. 
 
(C) Other  remuneration:  The  draft  Bill  previously  circulated  (MRD,  2011)  contained  an 
extensive R&R package. Its rigid requirements included various mandatory benefits other 
than  lump  sum  cash  payments,  including  employment  guarantees,  annuities,  company 
shares, land-for-land, share of appreciated land value after resale, and replacement of lost 
homestead. This was a recipé for increasing administrative costs, jeopardizing enforceability 
and compensating affected families in highly inefficient  ways. Anyone familiar with the 
amount  of  black  money  involved  in  India’s  real  estate  transactions  can  tell  that  giving 
previous owners a stake in the profits from resale is an open invitation to the new owners to 
conceal the real value of any future transactions. The employment guarantee provision was 
similarly open to abuse, since it did not specify conditions of termination. Companies can 
save a lot of money by employing farmers in positions incommensurate with their skills and 
firing them shortly afterwards for incompetence or insubordination. Annuities are a highly 
illiquid asset compared even to land and will prove useless in fortifying the family’s capacity 
to face a medical emergency, invest in children’s education or durable goods, and take out 
loans. Payment in company shares instead of cash exposes the recipient to undue risk. 
The Bill introduced in Parliament has commendably moved away from the earlier 
draft in this respect and has introduced a lot more flexibility into the package. Recipients will 
now have a choice between an annuity (Rs. 2,000 per month per family for 20 years), a job 
and a lump sum payment of Rs. 5 lakhs. Share of profits from resale has been restricted to 
cases where the property has remained undeveloped. In the case of urbanization projects, 
land-for-land provisions are not compulsory but an option that can be exercised against an 
appropriate deduction from the cash award. 
As Banerjee et al (2007) point out, receipt of a large amount of cash as the main 
source of livelihood may be problematic for people who lack investment expertise or even 
access to sophisticated financial instruments. The solution is to provide the farmer more 
options, not a rigid, one-size-fits-all portfolio of assorted non-farm assets. In other words, as 
a  default,  farmers  should  be  offered  compensation  entirely  in  the  most  fungible  form,   16 
together with access to banking services, investment advice and a choice of various financial 
instruments that poor peasants may be otherwise unaware of or find difficult to access. Our 
proposed method explicitly adds a critical asset (land) to the menu of choices because of 
market imperfections – namely, land in rural India is difficult to buy and sell. LARR, 2011, 
has rightly increased farmer choice in its design of the R&R package, but has left out the 
most important asset that farmers will possibly care about – land for cultivation. This is a 
major defect of the Bill.
13 
 
(D) Partial acquisition for industry: The previous draft Bill (MRD, 2011) allowed government to 
acquire land for private use (industries, SEZs, etc.) provided at least 70% of the total area 
needed  for  the  project  had  already  been  purchased  through  the  market.  The  Bill  before 
Parliament,  however,  has  no  such  provision  and  allows  acquisition  on  behalf  of  private 
companies only if the project serves a public purpose, as specified in section 2 (companies 
are still liable for R&R for large scale projects even when the land is acquired through 
private negotiations). Interpreted literally, LARR, 2011, has restricted the scope of eminent 
domain, though it may be argued that the definition of ‘public purpose’ is still kept vague 
enough  to  allow  government  acquisition  on  behalf  of  industries.  This  has  been  a  hotly 
debated  issue,  and  the  view  that  government  should  completely  stay  away  from  land 
transfers between private parties has been forcefully advocated by Mamata Banerjee as well 
as a majority of the NAC Working Group (NAC, 2011).
14 It is true that the state’s eminent 
domain power has historically aligned itself with corporate and commercial interests instead 
of  safeguarding  the  interests  of  poor  landowners,  but  this  is  precisely  what  the  new 
legislation is supposed to stop and even reverse. If one really believes that the new laws can 
make the state work in the interest of the poor, it is only logical to bring all kinds of land 
transactions within in its ambit rather than restrict its scope. The desire to curtail the state’s 
role betrays a lack of faith in the legislation’s professed ability to achieve its objectives. 
                                                 
13 As mentioned earlier, there is a provision in the Bill for some award of land, in the form of 20% of the developed 
area for urbanization projects and small plots in the command area for irrigation projects. The contrast with our 
proposal must be pointed out. This is not an award of arable land in most cases, it is not an acre-for-acre swap, and 
it makes no attempt to sort out the more land hungry from the less. In other words, it is a mechanical formula for a 
reduced and token award to be distributed among affected farmers on a pro-rated basis. 
 
14 Dr N.C Saxena of the NAC Working Group, however, favours state acquisition on behalf of industry. Dr Saxena’s 
reasoning is that reliance on open market purchases will leave small farmers at the mercy of the land mafia, prevent 
industries from locating in tribal areas where sale of land to non-tribals is illegal, and cause significant delays due to 
incomplete land records in many parts of the country. We find much greater merit in Dr Saxena’s position.    17 
 We think the single most important reason the state’s participation is essential in 
large scale land acquisition for industry has to do with reduction of transaction costs and 
expedition of the process. The market often works well in arranging bilateral transactions, 
but its effectiveness drops exponentially as the number of parties to the transaction grows 
large,  especially  in  a  country  like  India  where  property  rights  are  poorly  defined,  land 
records are fuzzy and courts work at a glacial pace. One must keep in mind that a legal 
problem may  crop up  even after a private sale has  been  completed; for example, if  the 
ownership of a plot of acquired land was under dispute
15, its sale could be challenged in 
court by other claimants to the property, taking years to resolve and holding up t he project 
due to a stay order till the ownership issue is settled. The thousand acres acquired in Singur 
came in such small parcels that there were nearly 12,000 owners involved.  
To get a quantitative sense of the problem, suppose that any particular private 
transaction has a 1% chance of facing a court challenge, causing significant delays. A single 
or a handful of such transactions (the kind of numbers needed for a housing project, say) has 
a very good chance of proceeding without a glitch. Simple calculations show that t he 
probability of at least one such legal snag developing (and a single dispute is enough to hold 
up the entire project) rises to 63% for 100 plot sales, and 99.99% for 1,000 plot sales.
16 For 
the  kind  of  numbers  involved  in  S ingur  and  many  other  places,  without  government 
participation, a legal quagmire is virtually a certainty. The advantage of bringing all the land 
under eminent domain is that these private disputes can be processed in parallel, without 
holding up the project itself. While it is important to pay attention to equity and justice, there 
is substantial common interest in seeing socially useful projects that generate economic 
surplus come to a quick fruition. In a poor nation where a bulk of the population lives on the 
brink of subsistence, a strident egalitarianism that is utterly indifferent to increasing the size 
of the pie is ultimately a disservice to the poor. 
 
(E) Compensating Livelihood Losers 
 
Under LARR, 2011, families who “[do] not own any land” but whose “primary source of 
livelihood stands affected”  are  entitled to  an R&R package (section  3(c)). The intended 
beneficiaries appear to be primarily tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers who 
                                                 
15 To consider a very plausible scenario, suppose the original owner has recently died, and an inheritance battle has 
broken out among his children. 
 
16 These are obtained by standard calculations using binomial distributions.   18 
worked on the seized property. It is commendable that the new law seeks to go beyond 
formal property rights and protect the interests of all persons affected by economic change. 
However, its attempts on this front are afflicted by the same problem that characterizes its 
choice of compensation amounts – an unwillingness to take into account the role of prices 
and market responses. 
Elementary  economic  reasoning  suggests  that  tenants  and  labourers  who  get 
displaced  from  the  acquired  land  will  flood  the  local  labour  and  land-lease  markets, 
depressing wages and driving up rents. Relief that is narrowly targeted at those who were 
attached  to  the  seized  properties  will  suffer  from  two  kinds  of  errors.  First,  unlike 
landowners, tenants and labourers do not lose their primary income generating asset (labour) 
– they merely have to find alternative employment opportunities (given market frictions, this 
may be difficult and time consuming). An R&R package that captures the full income stream 
being generated by their previous jobs is over compensation. Second, tenants and labourers 
working in neighbouring fields will be under compensated under the proposed scheme, since 
there is no provision to make up for the losses arising from increased competition in the 
relevant markets and the adverse price movements that will result from it. There can be 
many  other  sources  of  damage  to  the  local  population  –  groundwater  depletion,  loss  of 
access roads, loss of business for artisans, etc.  
Trying to reach all affected parties raises difficult issues of identification and damage 
assessment. We will not go into the problem in detail, since the focus of this article is on 
compensating  landowners.  As  a  general  approach,  we  see  much  merit  in  a  strategy  of 
investment in the local economy to raise general living standards and opportunities, instead 
of trying too hard to provide targeted entitlements to specific groups. These measures might 
include NREGA style employment guarantee programmes, infrastructure creation, and job 
retraining.  For the sake of credibility of delivery, these programmes should be in place 
before the acquisition process gets under way, instead of being dangled as empty promises 
for the future. Since it is difficult to track whether the diffused externalities from a project 
have been neutralized through local public goods creation and R&R packages, the idea of a 
referendum seeking the consent of a majority (or super-majority) is attractive. However, the 
Bill’s requirement of 80% approval seems to be on the higher side.  
One important caveat to the discussion above concerns the issue of long-term tenants 
or  tenants  who  enjoy  some  protection  from  eviction  under  law  (e.g.,  beneficiaries  of 
Operation  Barga).  Since  these  tenants  are  under  contractual  and/or  legal  protection  and 
cannot be arbitrarily evicted, they are legally entitled to some compensation if the land is   19 
sold.  There are other economic reasons for having a compensation policy in such cases (see 
Ghatak and Mookherjee (2011)).  Due to regulations or other distortions in the rental market, 
the tenant may be earning rents (e.g., due to a legally stipulated minimum crop share). In this 
case, vesting sole decision rights with the landlord concerning sale of the asset will generate 
socially excessive incentives  to  sell to third parties when the opportunity arises.  This  is 
because the landlord will neglect the effect of the sale on the loss of surplus by the tenant. 
Also, in the absence of a well-defined compensation policy, those who fear displacement due 
to the process of industrial development will tend to under-invest in the assets (e.g., land) 
which  will  affect  the  productivity  of  these  assets  in  their  existing  use,  as  well  as  the 
willingness of the owners to convert them to alternative uses.  
 
Conclusion   
 
Eminent domain is one of the most controversial and politically sensitive instruments of state 
power anywhere in  the  world.  Depending on how it is  used, it can clear the way  for rapid 
economic transitions, technological progress and inclusive growth, or it can trample on property 
rights,  the  economic  interests  of  poor  and  vulnerable  groups,  and  fundamental  principles  of 
justice.  The  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Bill,  2011,  is  clearly  a  long 
overdue attempt to address the inadequacies of the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which 
has been merrily exploited by commercial interests, corrupt politicians and an indifferent state to 
promote widespread land grab at the expense of the poor. Despite its good intentions, the draft 
Bill  misses  out  on  an  opportunity  to  promote  growth  and  prosperity  while  protecting  the 
vulnerable. There exist much better ways of converting agricultural land for industrial use or 
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